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Foreign policy 
and its distortion
By ALEC ROBERTSON
The M enzies Government 
has laid in ruins the con­
cept of an independent 
Foreign Australian policy.
rpHE perspective o f Australian foreign policy held by the
present Federal Government was tersely spelled out recently 
for world consumption by Sir Robert Menzies: “ Australia 
will in the next 20 years become more involved in interna­
tional affairs, especially in Asia. She will, until somebody 
discovers a magical peace formula, need to sustain large and 
growing defence commitments.” ('> (Emphasis added.)
The statement, which on careful reading may be seen to 
indicate increasing militarisation for an IN D EFIN ITE  period 
ahead, should be considered alongside another masterpiece 
of succinctness— that o f External Affairs Minister P. M. Has- 
luck in August, 1964: “ There is no current alternative to 
using force as necessary to check the southward thrust of 
militant Asian Communism.” <2)
Elaborating his survey o f foreign policy perspective, Men­
zies also said: “ Governments will come and go . . . but the 
broad principles of national policy may be expected to 
survive.”  (3)
Since early 1964, there has developed in Australia an un­
precedented public debate on foreign policy which, by com ­
mon consent, has deeply divided the nation.
Is this cleavage in public opinion concerned only 
with method and detail o f application o f otherwise acceptable 
broad policies? How, in fact, does the present government 
See these broad principles in the field o f foreign (including 
defence) policy, with reference to Asia and the Pacific?
Mr. Hasluck, as Minister, described the “ two consistent 
strands in Australian policy towards Asia” as:—
• T he search for means o f maintaining security “ both by
liances an^ by arrangements for regional cooperation” , and
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• Consistent willingness to “ assist in raising standards of 
living to help Asian countries to help themselves.”  <4>
T he practical application o f these high-sounding “ strands” 
by the Menzies and H olt Governments has included: military 
involvement in the Korean War, garrisoning o f Australian 
forces in Malaya, and more recently in Thailand and North 
Borneo, participation in the South East Asia Treaty Organ­
isation, com bat involvement in the Vietnam war under U.S. 
command and increasingly based on a combination o f regular 
army and conscript soldiers, orientation o f military procure­
ment towards the USA and o f military organisation towards 
US forms, sustained refusal to "recognise" China and this year 
the upgrading o f diplomatic recognition o f the Chiang regime 
on Taiwan.
A ll of these steps fall under the heading o f “ search for 
security” . Examination o f almost any government document 
on foreign policy in recent years reveals that the two most 
important aspects o f the government’s policy for “security” 
are: (1) Active opposition to what is called the "Chinese 
Communist threat” . (2) T h e military alliance with the USA.
These lines o f policy have been vociferously and almost 
unconditionally supported by non-government political forces 
such as those associated with the Democratic Labor Party and 
its inspirer B. A. Santamaria.
The Government’s concepts have been opposed consistently 
by, among others, the Communist Party (which has advocated 
an independent Australian foreign policy for peace and friend­
ship <5> and, to an increasing extent from  1964, by the 
national leadership o f the Australian Labor Party.
Direct opposition to the Vietnam war as “ an unjust war" 
and a declaration o f intention that a Labor government would 
immediately begin steps to withdraw Australian troops (6), 
are A LP  policies that have amounted to head-on collision 
with US policy on Vietnam.
It is, however, o f great significance to the Australian labor 
movement that the basic essentials o f the Government’s policy 
continue to be supported by an important right-wing section 
o f the Australian Labor Party.
This was shown clearly at this year’s conference o f the New 
South Wales branch o f the ALP, long the main centre of 
right wing leadership in that party.
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S in ce  Mr. Oliver made reference to the Curtin (wartime) 
Government as authority for his policy <7 & 8>, it appears that 
the ALP rightwing too believes that the “ broad policies are 
u n c h a n g in g .”  The facts, however, do not bear this out.
The real flowering of recognisably Australian foreign policy' 
co n ce p ts  came in the ’thirties, in the aftermath of the 1926 
Im p e r ia l Conference (which agreed on Dom inion autonomy 
in  fo r e ig n  affairs) and the 1931 Statute o f Westminster (giving 
D o m in io n  Parliaments full legal independence o f the British 
G o v e r n m e n t ) .
In this period, which was also marked by consciousness of 
Australia’s growing potential as a manufacturing country', 
the principal themes o f foreign policy discussion in­
cluded: the problem of seeing the Asian and Pacific region 
in sharp focus as required by Australia’s own needs (parti­
cularly in trade) as distinct from the secondary consideration 
it had always received from Britain; the problem o f national 
security, with special reference to the recognisable threat from 
aggressive Japanese imperialism; the importance o f China to 
Australia.
In 1937 at the Imperial Conference Australia’s Tory Prime 
Minister Lyons advocated a Pact o f non-aggression by the 
countries o f the Pacific, “ a regional understanding . . . con­
ceived in the spirit and principles o f the League.” Japan 
opposed it as a means o f preserving the status quo, the USA 
Said there were enough pacts already, and the Soviet U nion’s 
newspaper Izvestia (21 /5 /37) commented:
‘ ‘Such a pact would coincide with the interests o f all Pacific 
countries. Collective security in the Pacific would play a 
tremendous and possibly a decisive role in ensuring European 
peace and would be a powerful factor in preventing the 
terrible slaughter the fascist aggressors are preparing.”
But it was the war itself that crystallised Australian thinking 
on foreign policy. T he early-war Menzies Government, carry- 
•ng hangovers o f Nazi sympathies born of anti-communism and 
typified by the action in July 1940 o f actively supporting the 
closing o f the Burma Road into China (at the demand o f 
Japan), was followed by a Labor Government.
Those in the labor movement interested in elevating the
American alliance”  plank o f foreign policy have made much 
° f  Labor Prime Minister Curtin’s "pro-American”  statement
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in December, 1941 (see note 8) . There is, however, a good 
deal o f evidence that if this statement, made in the heat 
o f the moment after Japan attacked, really represented the 
Government’s thinking at the time, it was quickly modified.
Professor K. H. Bailey (Melbourne University), writing in 
1943 and noting that there had always been forces in the 
Labor movement asserting a "vigorously independent Austra­
lian nationalism” , said that Curtin had subsequently explained 
that his 1941 statement “ did not mean that Australia regarded 
itself as anything but an integral part o f the British Em­
pire.” <’ )
According to Bailey, the idea that Australian defence in 
1943 rested wholly on American-Australian cooperation was 
an “ exaggeration” , since in that year British material aid 
was “ probably not less than Lend-Lease” from the U SA
But the clearest formulation o f the first comprehensive 
foreign policy o f Australia came in this period from the 
External Affairs Minister, Dr. H. V. Evatt. Evatt, even in 
the darkest days o f the Pacific war, was not concerned only 
with the problems o f wartime relations.
In late 1941, Evatt was urging on Churchill the importance 
o f a closer political and military agreement with the USSR 
that would embrace contingencies in the Pacific. After Japan 
attacked, Evatt adopted, for the first time, the procedure of 
an independent Australian declaration o f war, as distinct from 
announcing (as Menzies had done) that there was a state of 
war as a legal effect o f a British declaration.
T h e  Labor Government’s view, as expounded by Evatt, was 
firstly that there must be an all embracing system o f security 
and also "Australia’s own security” , and secondly that “ peace 
and stability in the Pacific in the post-war period can be 
achieved only by building a way o f life in the Pacific in which 
the varied nations and peoples can live together in peace and 
prosperity . . . plans which take into account the legitimate 
aspirations o f  the peoples. . <'°>
Evatt developed this theme through to the end o f the war, 
insisting that the Atlantic Charter could and must apply liter­
ally to the Pacific, with its main points— no territorial aggrand­
isement, no territorial changes not freely desired by the people 
concerned, respect o f the right o f all nations to choose their 
own form o f government, and security for all nations from 
aggression and want after the disarming o f the aggressor.
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It is important to recall that Evatt and other members 
of the Curtin Government, were not merely ALP leaders 
b u t a lso  reflected the will o f a united popular movement in 
A u stra lia  backing the anti-fascist war, with the trade union 
m o v e m e n t and the Communist Party playing roles o f publicly 
re co g n ise d  importance.
And when Evatt said ("> “ the opportunities for expansion 
of our industries in the areas I have mentioned and in Asia 
will be almost limitless” , he was voicing the latent ambitions 
of sections o f Australian capitalism. But this does not alter 
the fact that the whole spirit and tone o f this policy towards 
other Pacific territories stood in marked contrast to what is 
happening today.
Speaking o f the duty to prom ote self-government in the 
territories, Evatt said challengingly “ the post-war order cannot 
be for the sole benefit of one power or group of powers . . . 
what we have to do is to develop a greater feeling o f under­
standing, friendship and comradeship with each other and all 
nations.”  <’ 2>
Evatt saw the USA as a very important factor in the Pacific 
of the future, but it was only one factor. T h e future, he 
said, would also depend on three other closely related factors: 
(a) a just peace in relation to Japan and its firm implementa­
tion; (b) establishment of a Pacific security zone within the 
context o f the Declaration o f General Security o f the Moscow 
Conference (to set up an international organisation based 
on the equality of all peace-loving states, large and small—
i.e. the United N ations); and (c) the positive policy towards 
the rights and well-being of all peoples in the region. <13)
The Australia-New Zealand Agreement o f January 21, 1944, 
the first foreign affairs agreement between the two countries, 
made two very significant points:—
• Wartime construction and use of bases did not, o f itself, 
afford any basis whatsoever for territorial claims after hostil- 
•ties were concluded.
• There must be no change in control or sovereignty of 
®ny islands in the Pacific (whether or not they were formerly 
Japanese) without the concurrence o f Australia and New 
Zealand in a general Pacific settlement.
Having in m ind that at this stage o f the war the USA was 
Steady straddling a big part o f the Pacific islands with bases,
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<here can be no doubt at all that this agreement, along with 
many other Australian statements, was in part a warning to 
the USA that it must not assume the right to dispose o f the 
Pacific in its own way.
Although Evatt, summing up the parliamentary debate d«) 
denied that the Agreement was aimed against the USA (the 
present deputy Prime Minister J. McEwen was one who had 
complained o f this) Evatt made no bones about the fact that 
something was afoot . . . “ It would be outrageous if Australia 
and New Zealand were not consulted. . .”  <,5)
In the same speech, he made it clear that the Australian 
Government regarded the Australia-New Zealand security zone 
as lying south o f the equator, while the US strategic zone of 
interest should be to the north o f the line.
This position was firmly retained later when the Austra­
lian Government, acting through Evatt, rejected US efforts 
to get Manus Island as a permanent naval base.
In the same 1944 parliamentary speech, Evatt expressed 
eloquently another theme which is implicit in all aspects of 
the Australian foreign policy o f the period: “Australia has 
emerged from a prolonged period o f national adolescence . . . 
the people of Australia have developed their own point of 
view and a mind o f their own . . .  we owe it to ourselves 
and to other countries to express it clearly and firmly . . .  a 
positive Australianism.”  He explained it meant not jingoism, 
isolationism or imperialism, but a recognition of certain needs 
and interests, security, and development.
There is a profound difference between such statements 
and the following summary o f Australian-American relations 
under Menzies: “ My little country and your great country 
will be together through thick and thin.”  <l6>
Harold H olt went even further with his "W e ’re all the way 
with LBJ." t'7) c. T . Oliver’s speech to the Labor Party contains 
some o f the same essence.
Dealing with China, Evatt’s broad view was that “ the future 
development o f the people of China will no longer be 
obstructed by restrictions on their self-respect and their right 
o f self-government. . <'•>
In sum, the significant principles underlying the Labor 
Government's foreign policy o f the wartime and immediate
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post-w ar period appear lo be: support for the world (UN) 
system  of security against aggression and within that, a 
P acific system and regional systems including one in the south­
west Pacific, south of the equator, centred on Australia and 
New Zealand; military forces for self-defence; collaboration 
w ith  Britain, the USA and others but on Australian terms; 
opposition to the return o f the old  colonialism in the region.
W h a t has h a p p e n e d  to  th ese  c o n c e p ts ?
So far as the ALP is concerned, much of the policy still 
stands on paper, although the references to the “ cooperation 
with the United States in the areas o f the South Pacific and 
Indian Oceans” are in such general terms that they are success­
fully used by rightwingers, in effect, to justify unlimited 
military "cooperation” with today’s US forces anywhere in 
Asia.
These rightwingers turn the former policy on its head to go 
close to supporting the “ broad principles” o f the Govern­
ment’s policy, and “ go slow” on such vital issues as opposing 
the Vietnam war.
The Menzies and Holt governments have completely dis­
torted the basis of the earlier policies.
(Concerning the United Nations, Hasluck in 1965, revealed 
a marked cooling off by the Government: "T h e  General 
Assembly is not able to function as the great forum o f the 
world . . .  At the present time the General Assembly and 
indeed the Security Council cannot be relied upon as a signi­
ficant and effective means o f keeping the |>eacc o f the 
world.” d ’ )
Concerning “ security” , the Menzies Government abandoned 
the concept o f “ Australia’s own defence” and embarked, in 
subordination to the USA and Britain, on a series o f military 
expeditions ranging from Korea to Malaysia.
But even this is not all. Early in 1966, possibly during 
the Humphrey-Harriman visit to Canberra, Australia collected 
“ new political responsibility— to pressurise European powers 
lnto joining in the Vietnam war. Thus, Hasluck in New 
York (20) said: "China’s armed expansion against its neigh­
bours— in South-East Asia, in southern Asia or on its western 
t>orders— is a threat to the security, for example, o f E u rope. . .  
lhis does not seem to be sufficiently appreciated by all the
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European countries.” He further recounted his ginger-up. 
Europe efforts on his return. <21>
As to the “ Chinese communist drive south” , the Menzies- 
Holt regime has always stuck to general terms. This is hardly 
surprising, since there are no troops o f the Chinese People’s 
Republic outside her borders, not even on the offshore islands 
still occupied by Chiang's US-protected garrisons.
But the behaviour o f Britain is instructive. Britain has 
never treated the south-east Asian situation (e.g. in Malaya, 
Singapore and Borneo) as anything other than local “ sub­
version” . Big reinforcements in 1963-64 were occasioned only 
by the Indonesian “ confrontation” policy. In 1966, Britain 
announced that the end o f “ confrontation” would mean 
massive withdrawal o f British forces from  the SE Asian 
region. Where then is the southward Chinese drive?
Additionally, any claim that the Vietnam war is justified 
by IN D IR E C T  Chinese pressure on Hanoi has been greatly 
weakened in 1965-66 when it has been generally conceded that 
the massive aid for the (North) Vietnamese Democratic 
Republic and the southern N LF has com e from the Soviet 
Union rather than China, and further that Hanoi has been 
following an independent political line including solidarity 
with the Soviet Union. Logically, the H olt Government could 
be expected to speak o f a “ southward Soviet drive” . But in 
fact, the issue o f Soviet aid to Vietnam— greater than China's 
could have been, is discreetly ignored by the Holt Govern­
ment.
It follows that the Government’s present policy is really 
based on something other than "China’s drive south” , despite 
the official statements.
A  clue to this may be found in another Hasluck statement 
March 23, ’65): “ T he participation o f countries outside 
Asia in its affairs is essential firstly to give to the smaller 
countries o f Asia security against the aggression that is arising 
within Asia itself and secondly to bring the financial, techno­
logical and social and economic assistance that is needed far 
the development o f Asian resources.”
In short, Asia must be protected from  itself (its unfinished 
anti-feudalist anti-imperialist revolutionary m ovem ents); and 
Australia is among those who aim to invest there.
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It must be concluded that Sir Robert’s “ unchanging” broad 
principles have been interpreted in a fundamentally different 
way since the time o f the Labor Government, and in a way 
dangerous to Australia.
This distortion o f conclusions that were reached in the 
very different time o f the anti-fascist wartime alliance is 
being com pounded by the extreme rightwing in today’s ALP 
in a way that cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged in the 
labor movement as a whole.
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